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FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY*
II. l UMAW~DFZ
If a tenant in fee simple granted a term for years or for
life, or even an estate in tail, we have seen that the part of the
fee undisposed of remained in the grantor and was called a
reversion. If he were to grant in the same instrument this re-
maining interest or reversion, or any part of it, to a third per-
son, this interest created in the third person was called a re-
mainder and not a reversion. To use the illustration given by
Williams in his work on Real Property,1 "If a grant be made by
A, a tenant in fee simple, to B for life, and after his decease to
C and his heirs, the whole fee simple of A will be disposed of,
and C's interest will be termed a remainder expectant on the
decease of B.
A remainder, as he further points out, always has its origin
in express grant, and "a reversion merely arises incidentally, in
consequence of the grant of the particular estate." The former
arises from act of the parties and the latter is created by opera-
tion of law.
The term "remainder" comes from the Latin verb
"remanere" and was originally used to signify that the interest
remained away from the grantor, did not come back to him
upon the termination of the first or particular estate granted,
and did not indicate that it remained in him. Whereas in the
case of -a reversion the land reverted or came back to the grantor
at the end of the term granted.
2
Remainders are either vested or contingent. A vested re-
mainder is a present interest in land the enjoyment of which is
15ostponed until the termination of the prior or particular estate;
*The first part of this article was published in VoL XII, Kentucky
Law Journal, p. 58.
2 (21st Ed.) 332, 333.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 21, 22.
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whereas a contingent remainder is merely the possibility of an
estate which, as Tiffany says, "exists when what would other-
wise be a vested remainder is subject to a condition precedent, or
is created in favor of an uncertain person or persons.' "3
According to Williams, a vested remainder "would be an
estate in possession, were it not that other estates have a prior
claim; and their priority alone postpones, or perhaps may
entirely prevent possession being taken by the remainderman.
The gift is immediate; but the enjoyment must necessarily de-
pend on the determination of the estates of those who have a
prior right to the possession." 4
The definition most often quoted with approval in the Ken-
tucky decisions is that given by Fearne in his treatise on Con-
tingent Remainders, Vol. 1, p. 216; "The present capacity of
taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become
vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will become
vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines, uni-
versally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is con-
tingent.' ,5
This test, as pointed out by Tiffany, is "not entirely ac-
curate, unless we exclude from the possible causes of vacancy of
possession the normal expiration of the preceding estate. In
the case, for instance, of a devise to A for life with remainder to
B and his heirs, provided B survives A, the remainder is coi-
tingent although capable, upon a vacancy in possession arising
from A's death, of taking effect in possession.6 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals, also refers to this fact in the case of Wihiam-
son v. William son,7 in these words: "This principle, however
general and universal it may be, has no application in a case
like this, where the event which renders the possession vacant also
resolves the contingency upon which the limitation depends, and
makes that certain which was before uncertain." This state-
ment is cited with approval by the court in the carefully writ-
3Real Property (2nd Ed.), 484.
4Real Property (21st Ed.), 345.
5Walter v. Oruther, 15 B. Mon. 2; Bowling's Reps. v. Dobyn's
Admr., 5 Dana 442; Johnson v. Robertson, et al., 45 S L W. 523, 20 Kyl
L. R. 135; Railey v. Milam, 5 S. W. 367, 9 Ky. L. R. 409; Sherley, et al.
v. Sherley, et aL, 192 Ky. 122, 232 S. W. 53.
61 Real Property (2nd Ed.) 494.
118 B. Monroe 368.
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ten opinion in Johnson v. Jacobs in which case the executors
were to hold certain property for the life of testator's son and
pay him the rents and profits. After the son's death the pro-
ceeds were to be paid to his descendants, if there be any living,
if none the property was to be conveyed to his hears. The
court held that the remaindermen, the descendants of the life
tenant, took contingent remainders since it was impossible to as-
certain what persons would fall within the description until the
death of the life-tenant The death of life tenant here rendered
the possession vacant, and also resolved the contingency upon
which the limitation depended.
As the court in this case suggested the remainderman must
be ascertained or ascertainable in order to have a vested re-
mainder. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because
the remainderman is ascertained the estate is vested. The court
has sometimes overlooked that fact as in the case of Mercantile
Bank of New York v. Ballard's Assignee9 and the case of John-
son, et al. v. Whitcomb, et al."' In the latter case there was a
devise to testator's wife for life, and after her death, the prop-
erty was to be equally divided among the testator's brothers and
sisters "hereinbefore mentioned" or such of them as should be
living at the death of the wife. The court held that the brothers
and sisters took a vested fee simple estate in remainder, subject
to be defeated by their deaths before the life tenant, and cited
with approval the decision in Mercantile Bank of New York v.
Ballard's Assignee. In that case a will provided: "But my son is
to have only the use thereof during his life for the maintenance
of himself and family, and no part thereof shall be liable for
his debts, nor shall he have the power to alienate, etc. After his
death or if 'he die before me, the fee simple of said property shall
be conveyed to his children, if he leave any, and their descend-
ants, in the same proportion as if it had descended from him; but
if he leave no children, or the descendant of a child, the same
shall be held in like manner for the support, use and benefit of
my daughter, etc." The court held that the son's children took
vested remainders, whether or not they were born when the will
"11 Bush 646, at page 658.
' 83 Ky. 481.
166 Ky. 673, 178 S. W. 821.
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-took effect and the fact that their interests might be divested by
their deaths before that of the life-tenant did not make the re-
mainders contingent. The court illustrates with the hypothe-
tical case of a devise to A for life, remainder to B, but if B is
dead at the termination of the life estate then to C, and says a
vested estate is passed to B and a contingent interest to C. It
seems clear that B's surviving A is a contingency on which the
vesting of any interest in him depends. It is not the case of a
devise to A for life, and a remainder to B for life, remainder to
C in fee. There it is universally conceded by the authorities
that B has a vested estate although he will not enjoy the same
unless he survives A. In the case put by the court if A should
purport to convey a fee simple to a stranger, before any change
was made by statute relative to the destructibility of contingent
remainders, the result would be a tortious fee in the stranger
and A's estate would be forfeited. As the contingency upon
which the vesting of B's interest depended, namely, his surviv-
ing A had not occurred, B would not be entitled to enter and
-his contingent interest under the common law rules would be
destroyed.
The error of holding that if the remainderman is ascer-
tained the interest is necessarily a vested one is probably due
to a statement of Chancellor Kent to the effect that the definition
of a vested remainder in the New York Statute "appears to be
accurately and fully expressed." 1 1  The court in Forsythe v.
Lansing's Exrs., &c.12 refers to this passage in Kent's Commen-
taries with approval. To quote from the opinion: "Kent (4
Comm. section 202) says: 'An estate is vested when there is an
immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present, fixed right
of future enjoyment.' The definition of a 'vested remainder' in
the New York Revised Statutes appears to be accurately and
fully expressed. It is, viz.: 'When there is a person in being, who
would have an immediate right of possession of the lands, upon
the ceasing of an immediate precedent estate.' " In Forsythe
v. Lansing's Ez'rs there was a devise of the profits of a farm to
testatrix's husband and to one of -her sons, W, during the life
of the husband, and after the husband's death one-half the farm
12 4 Kent, Comm. 202.
S109 Ky. 518, .519.
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to W and one-half to two other sons; provided if either son
should die childless his interest to go to the other two and if
two should die childless then to the survivor. It was held that
each took a vested interest subject to being defeated and that
the three took a fee simple and could pass it by a joint deed.
This is a very different proposition from that put in the hypo-
thetical case by the court in Mercantile Bank of New York v.
Ballard's Assignee.
Wherever there is a devise to A for life and then remainder
to the heirs of B, a living person, the remainder is clearly con-
tingent as the remaindermen are unascertained. Upon the death
of B they become certain and the remainder vests. The cases
also make it equally clear that a gift to A for-life and remainder
to his heirs in fee is also contingent, for a living person can have
no heirs, as it is expressed in old cases, Nemo est haeres viventis.
To use the words of the court in the decision of Williamson, etc.
v. Williamson, etc.,' 3 "The word heir, in its strict technical
sense, denotes the person on whom, at the ancestor's decease, the
law casts inheritance. No person can properly sustain the char-
acter of heir in the lifetime of the ancestor. (2 Jar. on Wills,
side p, 13.) Wherefore a limitation to the heirs of a person in ex-
istence (if it have the other qualities of a remainder), must be
a contingent remainder. "14 Where the heirs named as remain-
dermen are the heirs of the testator the interests are vested re-
mainders since the will speaks from the time of the testator's
death and means the heirs living at that time. Such was the
holding in Weil v. King, et al.15 A similar result was also
reached in Hunt v. Phkillips, et aZ.;18 and Campbell, et al v. Hin-
ton,17 et a.
A gift to A for life and after his death to his children, liv-
ing at testator's death, 'however, creates a vested remainder.' s
In the case of Turner v. Patterson, et al.19 there was a gift to
testator's daughter and her children and the court held the
18 B. Mon. 329.
See also Runyon v. Hatfeld, 154 Ky. 171; "Wilamson v. Maynard,
162 Ky. 726; Weatherford v. Boulware, 102 Ky. 466.
1104 S. W. 380, 31 Ky. L. R. 1010.
- 105 S. W. 445, 32 Ky. L. R. 257.
I150 Ky. 546.
( Coots v. Yewell, 95 Ky. 367, 25 S. W. 597.
29 5 Dana 292.
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estate vested in the children living at testator's death subject to
open and vest in each after-born child as it came into being.
The word children here was taken as a term of purchase and not
of limitation and the mother and children took a vested interest
as tenants in common. In Johnson v. Robertson, et al.20 an
estate was deeded to a wife for life or so long as she remained
unmarried, with -a remainder to the grantor's children and it-
was held that a vested remainder was created in the children,
which was not divested by the death of the life tenant before
that of the grantor. Remainders to children were held vested
in Boach v. Dance, et al.;21 Pedigo's Ex'r, et at. v. Botts, et al.;
2 2
and Young v. Monroe, et at. 23 WVhere, however, the devise was
to children living at death of the life tenant it was correctly held
in McKee v. McKee's Ez'r;2 4 White's Trustee v. White, &C.;25
Loab v. Strtck, et al.;26 Whalen, et al. v. Kellner, et al.;27 Pro-
man v. Froman;28 Craig v. WTiliams; 29 and Nunnelly's Guar-
dian, et al. v. Nunnelly, et al.;30 that the remainders were con-
tingent. They would also be contingent where the children were
unborn at the death of the testator.3 1 Such an interest would
vest upon the birth of children. 32 A devise of a remainder to a
posthumous child would be vested, it would seem, under statu-
tory provisions. Section 2079 provides that "A posthumous
child shall be considered a devisee under law of contribution,
and entitled to all the rights, and liable to all his responsibili-
ties." Section 2350 also provides that such a child shall take
the estate "in the same manner as if he or she had been born in
the lifetime of the parent, notwithstanding no estate shall have
been conveyed to support the remainder after the death of the
parent."
It is a well settled rule as'to remainders that the law favors
45 S. W. 523, 20 Ky. L. R. 135.
= 80 S. W. 1097, 26 Ky. L. R. 157.
"89 S. W. 164, 28 Ky. L. R. 196.
"199 Ky. 603.
-82 S. W. 451, 26 Ky. L. R. 736.
"86 Ky. 602.
"42 S. W. 401, 19 Ky. I. R. 935.
104 S. W. 1018, 31 Ky. L. R. 1285.
"175 Ky. 536, 194 S. W. 809.
"179 Ky. 329, 200 S. W. 481.
"180 Ky. 131, 201 S. W. 976.
Lepper v. Lee, 92 Ky. 161, 7 S. W. 146.
"Glare, et al. v. mcob, et al.,. 199 Ky. 581.
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construing them as vested rather than as contingent wherever
possible. In Pcarcy, &c. v. Greenwel, &c.33 the court said,
"The law favors vested estates, and will not construe them to
be contingent unless the intention of the testator requires such
construction." In that case land was given upon condition the
devisees pay certain sums to persons named. This provision
was held not a c6ndition precedent to title vesting. In Washer's
Exor. v. Washer's Exors.34 the court construed words of sur-
vivorship as meaning death before the testator and held the
estate vested rather than contingent. Again in Grubb's Ez'or.,
et al.35 land devised to testatrix's son was regarded as a vested
remainder notwithstanding a provision that he care for and
maintain his parents during their lives. This created a condi-
tion subsequent. In Moore's Adm'r v. Sleet, &C.36 a devise was
made to a wife for life, remainder to a nephew, providing that
if he should die "before he come into possession or before he
arrives at twenty-one years of age" the estate should go over.
The court went so far as to hold the remainder vested upon the
iiephew's becoming twenty-one as it was clear, the court said,
that or was to be read as and.
Under the common law a limitation to A for life, with a
remainder to his heirs or to the heirs of his body, a fee-simple
or an estate tail, according to whichever limitation was used, was
created in A. This principle was known as the Rule in Shelley's
case. The heirs of A in such a case were said to take by descent
under A and not by purchase. It was necessary that both the
particular estate in the ancestor and the remainder in his heirs
should both be created by the same instrument. The Court of
Appeals, however, early held that the rule in Shelley's case has
no application to conditions in this country and is not in force
in Kentucky.37
Of course where a remainder is given to vest upon the hap-
pening of some event that may occur before the termination of
s80 Ky. 616.
24143 Ky. 643.
'190 Ky. 258, 227 S. W. 272.
- 113 Ky. 600, 68 S. W. 643.
3 Turman v. White's Heirs, 14 B. Mon. 450; Williams, etc. v. Wab
Nams, etc., 18 B. Mon. 329; Turner v. Patterson, et aL, 5 Dana 292;
Alexander, dc. v. De Kermel and Wife, 5 Ky. L. R. 382. See Kentucky
Statutes, Section 2345.
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the prior, or particular estate as it is called, upon the happen-
ing of such event the estate becomes vested. Thus in Hunt v.
Phil ips, et al.38 where there was a devise to A and B for their
lives with remainder to M and her heirs, upon the death of M in
the lifetime of the life-tenants, the remainder in M's heirs, which
before was contingent, was held to vest.
In the case of a contingent remainder in fee simple created
by a form of conveyancing under the Statute of Uses or by a
devise the question naturally arises as to where the fee is until
the remainder vests. Chancellor Kent took the position that in
such a case the fee was in abeyance until the contingency occur-
red which should operate to vest it in the remainderman, and the
grantor in the meantime had only a possibility of reverter.3 9
This view was taken by the court in Boh-on, &c. v. Bohon, &c.
40
The court said: "That an estate in fee may be made to pass out
of the grantor so as to remain in abeyance, in the clouds, in no
person, pending the existence of the particular estate, seems to
be well settled, notwithstanding the able argument of Mr. Fearne
to the contrary." The better view, which is supported by the
great weight of authority, is that the title remains in the grantor
until the contingency happens, or in the case of a devise, in his
heirs, or it might be, -as Tiffany suggests, in a special devisee,4 '
and this view was taken later by the Court of Appeals in Coots
v. Yewel, &o.42 In this case no reference is made to the case
of Bohon v. Bohon. Both cases are cited by the court in Baxter
v. Bryan43 and the latter decision is followed. The statement
from Fearne is quoted with approval: "'Where a remainder of
inheritance is limited in contingency by way of use or devise, the
inheritance in the meantime, if not otherwise disposed of, re-
mains in the grantor and his heirs or in the heirs of the testator
until the contingency happens to take it out of them."144  The
same question arose in the case of Newton, et al. v. Sotern
Baptist Theological Seminary,45 and the court said: "There
"105 S. W. 445, 32 Ky. L. R. 257.
"4 Kent Comm. 257.
78 Ky. 410.
"Real Property (2nd Ed.), Section 141.
95 Ky. 367, 26 S. W. 179.
"94 S. W. 633, 16 Ky. IA. R. 2.
Fearne on Remainders, p. 351.
" 115 Ky. 414, 74 S. W. 180.
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is a technical rule which recogmizes a fee in abeyance, but that
state of abeyance was always odious, and never admitted, but
from necessity. Kent's Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 259. Such
necessity does not exist in this case. The title was not in abey-
ance, but upon the death of the testator vested in his only child,
who could only have been deprived of it by remainder becoming
effective which was attempted to be placed in the Baptist Male
School, which failed." While none of these three later cases
purports to overrule Bohon v. Bohon, the language of the court
is such as to lead one to believe in effect it is overruled.
Perhaps one of the most striking characteristics of a contin-
gent remainder under the old common law rule was its destructi-
bility. It could be destroyed by the termination of the particu-
lar estate before the happening of the contingency upon which
the remainder depended. This principle is well illustrated in a
fairly recent Illinois case, Bond v. Moore,46 where there was a
devise "to my son for life, should he die without issue, then the
estate shall go to my nearest relatives.' The testatrix meant
to provide for the son's children but forgot to insert a pro-
vision in their favor. The son had two daughters. He made a
conveyance in fee and thereby worked a forfeiture of his life
estate and the destruction of the contingent remainder. As the
reversion descended to him as heir at law, upon a reconveyance to
him, he held free and clear of the remainder. As this doctrine
has little reason for its existence under modern conditions and
has often in the past been made use of by unscrupulous holders
of particular estates to defraud contingent remaindermen from
realizing upon their interests, legislation has been passed in Eng-
land and most of our states rendering contingent remainders
non-destructible for want of a particular estate to support them.
Section 2346 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that "a contin-
gent remainder shall, in no case, fail for want of a particular
estate to support it" and section 234'7 enacts that "the aliena-
tion of a particular estate on which a remainder depends, or the
union of such estate with the inheritance by purchase or descent,
shall not operate by merger or otherwise to defeat, impair or af-
fect such remainder."
Suppose, however, that the particular estate is void or that
' 1908, 236 Ml1. 576, 86 N. E. 386, 19 L. I. A. (N. S.) 540.
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the life tenant waives the estate in favor of some provision under
the statutes or that the remainder is to take effect upon the death
of the widow who is given an estate for life or until she marries,
and she marries; in such cases are the remaindermen's interests
moved forward or accelerated? Under the earlier common law
rules a distinction was made where the remainder was created
by deed and where by will. This earlier view is well set out in
the court's opinion in Timberlake v. Parish's Ex'or.47 in the
words of the court: "The fact that the particular estate was not
accepted, and therefore did not take effect, did not, per se, de-
stroy the remainder, as it might have done, had the document
of title been a deed instead of a will; for, not only does the inten-
tion generally prevail in a will, but an executory interest may
be created by it, without the intervention or support of an inter-
mediate estate. And therefore, as every distinct legacy or de-
vise, without any expressed motive or object, will be deemed, in
the absence of any intimation to the contrary, in the will, a
bounty to each several devisee or legatee, the non-acceptance or
forfeiture by one, can not destroy the separate right of another
beneficiary, but would have the effect only of hastening the en-
joyment by the latter, when his vested interest was made-not
to depend upon the former, but only to succeed it." At the
present time it is immaterial whether the interest is created by
deed or will4s and it is clearly settled that where land is given
to A for life with remainder to B, if the life estate is terminated
in any way as by the renunciation of a will by a widow the re-
mainder takes effect at once; 49 that is where the remainder is
vested. In the case of a contingent remainder the general rule
is that there is no acceleration where the particular estate is void
or renounced by the life tenant. Such was the decision in
Augustus, etc. v. Seabolt, etc.50 where there was a devise to tes-
tator's wife for life, and after her death, to be equally divided
among the children of testator's brothers, or such of them as
should be living at the wife's death. There was a provision that
if she remarried she should not hold the land. It was held that
T 5 Dana 347.
Kentucky Statutes, Section 2341.
19 O'Rear v. Bogie, 147 Ky. 668; Faulkner v. Tucker, et aL, 83 S. W.
579.
5, 3 Metef. 155.
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upon her re-marriage the heirs at law took until the wife's death
when the contingent remainderman would take. In O'Rear v.
Bogies1 the court said: "While there are not a few cases holding
that the renunciation of a will by a widow will not precipitate a
contingent remainder, they recognize the rule that this will not
be so held where to do so will defeat the testator's intention ap-
parent on the whole will, and we are of opinion that this case
falls within the exception." Tiffany in referring to this case
says, that a contingent remainder can accelerate if such is the
intention, would seem to be impossible; and that in this case the
remainder appears actually to have been a vested one.52 In view
of the construction given certain phrases in the will, this obser-
vation seems correct. In Keeton, et al. v. Tipton, et al.,5 the
life tenant after enjoying the estate for several years came into
court and renounced his interest and joined with part of the
contingent remaindermen in asking for a sale and a division of
the proceeds. It was contended that his renunciation accelerated
the remainders. The court refused to take this view and said
that at most his renunciation operated as a conveyance of the
life interest and not as a destruction of it.
The principle that where the remainderman acquires the
life estate there will be a merger of the two and the life estate is
extinguished, was recognized in Larmom v. Larmon, et al.54 and
Hunt v. Phillips, et al.5 5 In the former case the court quotes
the following statement of the doctrine from Blackstone:
"Whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one
-and the same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is
immediately annihilated; or, in the law phrase, it is said to be
merged, that is, sunk or drowned in the greater. Thus, if there
be a tenant for years, and the reversion in fee simple descends
to or is purchased by him, the term of years is merged in the
inheritance, and shall never exist any more."
The next question that naturally suggests itself is whether
a remainder is assignable. A vested remainder, being an estate
51157 Ky. 670, 163 S. W. 1107.
1 Real Property, note 97, p. 524.
"184 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 909.
173 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 909.
105 S. W. 445, 32 Ky. L. R. 257.
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and not a mere possibility of an estate in the future, was assign-
able under the old common law rules. It could be conveyed by
deed 56 or passed upon the death of the remainderman to his
heirs or to his vendee or devisee.5 A contingent remainder, be-
ing merely a possibility of a future estate, was not assignable at
common law. It might be released, and where one having a
contingent remainder, purported to convey his interest and the
estate later vested in him the conveyance might take effect under
the doctrine of deed by estoppel or might be enforced in equity.58
The common law rule as to the assignability of contingent re-
mainders has been changed by statute in this state and today
they are held to pass either by deed or will under section 2341,59
and a contingent interest may be subjected to claims of judg-
ment creditors. 60 Of course the assignee or devisee of such an
interest takes nothing if the contingency does not happen so that
the estate -will vest. The head note to the recent case of Kend-
rick v. Scott61 states that a contingent remainderman has no
alienable interest during the life of the life tenant. Of course
it is not intended to hold that he has not an alienable interest
within the meaning of section 2341. The facts of the case do not
seem to support such a view nor does the opinion of the court.
The contingent remainderman who first purported to convey
his interest did not survive the life tenant, his survival being the
contingency on which his interest depended, so that nothing
passed under the deed. One of the other contingent remainder-
men gave a quitclaim deed purporting to convey any interest he
might have in the land which was conveyed under the deed by
the first remainderman to convey. The court correctly held that
nothing passed under either deed and that the doctrine of estop-
pel did not apply as the latter deed was a quitclaim deed.
Interesting questions arise as to the respective rights and
obligations regarding the property during the continuance of the
Johnson v. Jacobs, 11 Bush 646.
Williams v. Maynard, 162 Ky. 726; Park v. McCombs, 146 Ky. 327,
142 S. W. 401.
13 Grayson v. Tyler's Ad nx., dc., 80 Ky. 358.
5White's Trustee v. White, dc., 86 Ky. 602; Bank of Taylorsvife,
efal. v. Vandyke, et al., 159 Ky. 201, 166 S. W. 1024.; Fulton.. Teage_,
et al., 183 Ky. 381, 209 S. W. 535.
0 Jacob v. Howard, et al., 22 S. W. 332.
61200 Ky. 202.
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particular estate. In Lindgenberger v. CornelP2 the life tenant
who was required to remove an encumbrance secured by a lien
on the property to prevent its sale, was given a lien upon the
entire property for recoupment. She was not, however, allowed
to charge the remainderman with part of costs of repairs made
on the property. The court's statement on this point was:
"It would seem that a life tenant receiving a house which was in
need of ordinary repairs, it would be his duty to put it in repair,
and, at the least, having done so, it would be presumed to have
been done for his own comfort and convenience, and would not
be made a charge upon the remaindermen personally or against
their interest in the property." To the same effect is the decis-
ion in Larmom v. Larmon, et al.63
As pointed out in Foster v. Foster, et al,64 "until the death
of the life tenant the remainderman has no right to control or use
the property nor to reduce it to possession. Where a remain-
derman, as in this case, placed improvements on the property,
knowing his rights and the rights of the other remaindermen,
he could not remove them nor recover the value when he vacated.
Taxes are a lien on the property and where, as in Davies'
Ez'r v. City of Louisvle0 5 the tax was assessed against the
remainderman when it should have been assessed against the
life tenant and the life tenant died, thereby terminating the life
estate, the court held that property being owned by the life ten-
ant and the remainderman the taxes were a lien upon the interest
of each and as the life tenant had not paid, the remainderman
must pay to relieve the property.
As to a remainderman's right to sue for injury to the prop-
erty before coming into possession, the old English statutes pro-
vided that only those who had a reversion or remainder in fee or
in tail immediately following the interest of the one committing
the waste could bring suit. Section 2328 of the Kentucky Stat-
utes makes a life tenant liable for waste and section 2329 pro-
vides that "the action may be maintained by one who has the
remainder or reversion in fee-simple after an intervening estate
for life or years, and also by one who has a remainder or rever-
8190 Ky. 844.
8173 Ky. 477.
"189 Ky. 370, 225 S. W. 48.
171 Ky. 663.
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sion for life or years only, and each of them shall recover such
damages as it shall appear that he has suffered by the waste com-
plained of."
This statute does not allow contingent remaindermen to
maintain an action for waste.66 Equitable relief, nevertheless,
may be granted a contingent remainderman as well as a vested
remainderman when necessary to protect his interests,67 and
where the life tenant attempted to repudiate the title of the
remaindermen an action was allowed the latter to protect their
rights and remove a cloud on their title in Frey v. Clark.67
Finally the question as to when actions by remaindermen
will be barred remains for consideration. As a general rule
the statute of limitations does not run against a remainderman
until the particular estate is determined.6 8 Where the action
is available to the remainderman, the statute begins to run at
once. In Fisher v. Haney the court pointed out that in the case
of voluntary waste on the part of the life tenant since the statute
gives the remainderman an immediate right to sue, he must bring
his action within the five years set by the statute of limitations
but that in the case of permissive waste the cause of action did
not finally accrue until the death of the life tenant.
III. EXECUToRY DEvisS
A devise of a freehold estate to take effect in the future,
that is at a time subsequent to the testator's death, either with
or without a preceding limitation to another, which estate could
not take effect as a contingent remainder, was known as an "exe-
cutory devise." 6 9 An example of such an executory limitation
would be a devise to A of an estate to take effect upon his return
from Rome. In Fulton v. Teager, et a,. 0 where there was a
devise to a wife for life, remainder to testator's son and niece
and in the event of the death of the niece without child prior to
the death of the wife, then her moiety to the son, the court
"Fisher's Bx'r. v. Haney, et al., 180 Ky. 257; Taylor v. Harvey, et
al., 100 S. W. 258, 30 Ky. L. R. 1045.-
61 Fisher v. Haney, supra; Frey v. Clark, 176 Ky. 661.
1 PFhillips v. WiZiamson, 184 Ky. 396; Bates v. Adam, 182 Ky. 100;
Jackson v. Claypoo7, 179 Ky. 662.
1 Tiffany, 552.
7 0183 Ky. 381, 209 S. W. 535.
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in considering the son's interest in this moiety said: "His
interest, however, is not a contingent remainder. A re-
mainder can not be limited upon a fee, because it would be the
creation of an estate in derogation of the fee, and this ancient
doctrine of the common law yet prevails, although the lee
should be a qualified one, or a conditional or base fee, as is
a defeasible fee. The interest devised to J. Stealey Teager, (the
son), in the portion of the property, which was devised to Emma
Louise Stealey, in remainder, has all the elements of a contingent
remainder, except that it is a contingent estate limited upon the
defeasible fee of Emma Louise Stealey, which by the common
law, is an impossibility. It is, however, an interest in land, and
is of the character of estates, which have grown up under the
statute of uses and the statute of wills, and now well recog-
nized, and which, if created by a deed, would be denominated an
estate upon a conditional limitation, and when created by will,
as was this one, is called an executory devise."
As held in the case of Nunnally v. White's Ex'rs'l an exe-
cutory devise could not be destroyed by the holder of a prior
estate as was possible in the ease of a contingent remainder. An
executory devise was indestructible. Neither the conveyance of
the property by the holder of the defeasible fee nor the posses-
sion of it by the purchaser claiming as his own, no matter how
long continued, before the happening of the contingency upon
which the executory devise was to take effect, the court said,
could defeat the rights of the executory devisees.
Originally, as the name suggests, executory devises could
be created by will only. Section 2341 of the Kentucky Statutes
has changed this. This section provided that "any estate may
be made to commence in future by deed, in like manner as by
will, and any estate which would be good as an executory devise
or bequest, shall be good if created by deed."
Where there is a gift to A and then an executory devise over
to B upon a certain event happening, A is said to have a de-
feasible fee, a fee simple-subject to be defeated upon the event
happening.7 2 In case the executory limitation is invalid, the
estate of A continues. The occurrence of the event specified does
713 Mete. 584.
2Simpson v. Adams, 127 Ky. 790.
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not mark the limit of A's estate but rather gives B the right to
defeat it. If for some reason B's right does not mature, A's
estate continues.
In conclusion it may be said that statutory enactments in
Kentucky have practically abolished the marked differences that
existed at common law between vested remainders, contingent
remainders, and executory devises. Since a contingent remain-
der is now indestructible for reason of there being no particular
estate to support it and since it is now held to be an alienable
interest in land, it would seem to make practically no difference
whether a remainder were held to be a vested "defeasible" fee
or a contingent remainder in fee. An assignee in either ease
would acquire nothing if the event upon which the interest de-
pended should not happen. Furthermore it is now possible to
create by deed an executory limitation which formerly could be
created by will only. W. LLvm ROBERTS.
University of Kentucky College of Law.
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